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 Abstract— In this paper, we propose a probabilistic key 
predistribution scheme for wireless sensor networks that 
increases connectivity of the basic scheme while keeping sizes of 
keyring and key pool fixed. We introduce the concept of XORed 
key, which is the bitwise XOR of two regular (a.k.a. single) keys. 
Sensor nodes are preloaded with a mixture of single and XORed 
keys. Nodes establish secure links by using shared XORed keys 
whenever possible. If node pairs do not have any shared XORed 
or single keys, they transfer keys from their secure neighbors in a 
couple of ways, and use them to match with their XORed keys. In 
this way, the probability of securing links, i.e. local connectivity, 
increases. The decision of which key is to be transferred from 
which node is given based on local information at the hand of the 
nodes. We aim to control the resilience of the network against 
node capture attacks by using XORed keys since an attacker has 
to know either both single key operands or the XORed key itself. 
Simulations show that our scheme is up to 50% more connected 
as compared to basic scheme. Also it has better resilience 
performance at the beginning of a node capture attack. When it 
starts to deteriorate, the difference between the resilience of our 
proposed scheme and basic scheme is not greater than 5%. 
Keywords— key predistribution; probabilistic key management; 
wireless sensor networks; security 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Wireless sensor networks [1] are composed of mobile, 
battery powered, small devices called sensors, which are 
capable of collecting environmental information such as 
temperature and humidity, making computation of easy 
operations, storing data in memory, and communicating with 
each other by transmitting data with radio add-on. Wireless 
sensor networks gained importance in the last decade due to 
widespread application areas from environmental monitoring 
to medical use, and from object tracking to military fields. The 
critical usage areas of sensor networks also provide point of 
attraction for researchers.  
Wireless sensor networks are generally deployed in 
relatively wide geographic areas and require sensors nodes in 
large quantities to achieve high connectivity in radio 
communication; therefore, they need to be inexpensive. 
Despite the recent advances in technology, sensor nodes still 
have restricted computing power, limited storage capacity and 
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short communication range because of cost and battery 
considerations.  
There exist some potential security risks in wireless sensor 
networks when they carry critical data. Wireless nature of 
communication provides advantages to adversaries. They can 
surreptitiously listen to communication between sensors 
without being noticed. Another risk is caused of unconfined 
sensors in the field. When the sensor nodes are used in 
unattended fields, they become open to physical attacks. 
In order to overcome these security threats, cryptographic 
security mechanisms should be employed. However 
integration of security systems in wireless sensor networks is 
not intuitive due to some limitations. Lack of network 
topology information prior to deployment causes an 
infrastructureless network. Unknown infrastructure and 
unreliable deployment zone make the trusted third party 
solutions almost inapplicable for wireless sensor networks. In 
recent years, important researches have been done to make 
public key cryptosystems feasible for resource-limited sensor 
nodes. However, using public key cryptosystems in large and 
dense sensor networks in a practical way is still a remote 
possibility. The remaining solution is conventional 
cryptosystems that do not require too much computational 
power, energy and running time. Here the open question is 
distribution of keying material within wireless sensor 
networks and without being compromised.  
Research on key distribution in wireless sensor networks is 
concentrated on probabilistic key predistribution. One of the 
first schemes is proposed by Escheneauer and Gligor [2], 
which is also known as the basic scheme. In the basic scheme, 
there is a key pool that contains a large amount of keys and 
their unique key identifiers. The keyring of a sensor node is 
formed by selecting some keys from key pool uniformly 
random without replacement. After the deployment of the 
nodes, two neighboring sensor nodes try to find a common key 
in their keyrings to be used as their link key. Actually, they 
share such a common key probabilistically. This probability, 
which is called as local connectivity, depends on the size of 
the key pool and of the keyring. More specifically, local 
connectivity is directly proportional to the keyring size and 
inversely proportional to the key pool size. 
In this paper, we propose a scheme that increases 
connectivity of basic scheme while keeping sizes of keyring 
and key pool fixed. We also propose to use XOR of two 
regular keys in the keyrings of the sensor nodes. There are 
some other papers in the literature, such as [3], that uses 
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 XORed keys. However, to the best of our knowledge, our 
scheme is the first in the literature that uses XORed keys 
directly in the keyrings. XORed keys are pushed to be used as 
link keys in our scheme for the purpose of reinforcing 
resilience of the network, since an attacker has to capture 
either both operand regular keys used in an XORed key or the 
XORed key itself in order to compromise a secure link. 
Another contribution of the proposed scheme is that, we 
employ a novel key transfer phase in which missing keys to 
are transferred from secure neighbors to improve local 
connectivity. The unique characteristic of our key transfer 
phase is that, the transfer decisions are taken by the nodes 
using local information; no extra broadcast messages are 
flooded in the network as in path-key establishment phase of 
the basic scheme. With the optimal mixture of regular and 
XORed keys in the keyrings, local connectivity performance 
of our scheme is up to 50% more than the connectivity 
achieved in basic scheme [2]. Moreover, our scheme does not 
significantly deteriorate the resilience of the network against 
node capture attacks as compared to the basic scheme.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II 
gives an overview of our scheme and describes its phases in 
detail. Section III explains performance metrics and gives 
comparative simulation results. Related work in the literature 
is given in Section IV. Finally Section V concludes the paper. 
II. PROPOSED SCHEME 
In this section a random key predistribution scheme for 
wireless sensor networks is proposed. In this scheme, we use a 
novel key type called XORed key, which is bitwise XOR of 
two regular keys. In order to differentiate XORed and regular 
keys, we rename regular keys as single keys throughout this 
paper. Our scheme uses a combination of XORed and single 
keys in the keyrings of sensor nodes. Since XORed keys are 
produced using two single keys, a secure link established 
using XORed keys is more resistant to attacks.  
As in Chan et al.’s scheme [3], our scheme uses two single 
keys contributed in the establishment of link key. However, in 
our scheme, keyrings of nodes are composed of variety of 
XORed and single keys, as opposed to the homogeneous 
structure of keyrings in Chan et al.’s scheme [3]. 
Our scheme has a phase called transfer phase which 
increases the local connectivity of the network by transferring 
keys from secure neighbors whenever needed. Transferred 
keys are not used directly; instead their XORed forms are 
used. In other words, keys are transferred to complete missing 
operands of XORed keys in the keyring. 
The symbols and notations used in this paper are given in 
Table 1.  
A. Overview 
Our scheme is based on probabilistic key predistribution 
like the basic scheme [2]. It includes three main phases which 
are (i) key predistribution, (ii) shared-key discovery, and (iii) 
key transfer phases. Although key predistribution and shared-
key discovery phases in our scheme have similar 
characteristics with corresponding phases of the basic scheme, 
our scheme differs from basic scheme with one important 
feature, which is the keying material. There are two types of 
keys stored in the keyrings of the nodes. Transfer phase is a 
novel phase in our scheme. In this phase, some manipulations 
are performed to improve the local connectivity of the 
proposed scheme. 
TABLE 1. LIST OF SYMBOLS USED IN THIS PAPER 
SP Key pool of single keys 
XP  Key pool of XORed keys 
ixk  XORed keyring of node i  
isk  Single keyring of node i  
SP  Global single key pool size 
XP  Global XORed key pool size 
m Keyring size 
sk  Single keyring size 
xk  XORed keyring size 
N  Set of all nodes 
iNL  List of neighbors of node i  
iSecureNL  List of neighbors of node i  with at least one 
shared key 
BA key⎯→⎯  A sends key to B in a secure way 
 
Workflow of abovementioned phases are shown in Figure 
1. Key predistribution phase and shared-key discovery phase 
are split into two parts as single key and XORed key 
subphases since the key types involved are different. 
 
 
Single Key Predistribution Phase 
XORed Key Predistribution Phase
Shared XORed Key Discovery Phase
Shared Single Key Discovery Phase
Transfer Phase 
 
Figure 1. Work flow of the proposed scheme 
B. Key Predistribution Phase 
Key predistribution phase starts with offline generation of a 
large single key pool of | SP | keys. Each single key is 
assigned a unique key identifier. In addition to that, we use a 
virtual XORed key pool, which is composed of keys obtained 
by XORing distinct single keys of the single key pool. The 2602
 total number of XORed keys in the XORed key pool is the 
total number of binary combinations of all single keys in the 
single key pool. Thus, the size of the XORed key pool is the 
following: 
( ) 2/1−×= SPSPXP              (1) 
 Virtuality of XORed key pool comes from the fact that it is 
not actually generated; whenever a key from the XORed key 
pool is to be drawn, two random single keys of the single key 
pool are XORed. In this way, such a large key pool can easily 
be managed. For the sake of consistency in terminology, we 
will not use the term "virtual" while referring XORed key pool 
in the rest of the paper.  
Key identifier of an XORed key x is defined as ji || , where 
i and j are key identifiers of the corresponding single keys 
from which x is derived. 
Next step is to generate the keyrings of the sensor nodes. To 
do so firstly sk  distinct single keys from SP are drawn 
uniformly random without replacement for each node in order 
to form single keyrings. After this process, XORed keyrings of 
the sensor nodes are established by selecting xk  XORed keys 
from XORed key pool XP for each node uniformly random 
without replacement. If one of the single key operands of a 
selected XORed key is already in the single keyring of the 
node, selected XORed key is ignored and a new one is drawn. 
Thus, the node can derive as many new XORed keys as 
possible from available single keys in its keyring. We will 
explain the reason why the nodes need to produce XORed 
keys from the single keys in their keyrings in Section 2.C. 
Total keyring memory size of the sensor nodes is the sum of 
the single keyring size and the XORed keyring size, as given 
in Equation 2. 
xkskm +=                   (2) 
C. Shared-Key Discovery Phase 
After key predistribution phase is completed, sensor nodes 
with preloaded keyrings in memory are deployed over the 
field. After settlement, nodes scan their neighborhood 
independently. Each sensor node broadcasts node identity and 
the identifiers of single and XORed keys that they have. At the 
end of the transmission of own key identifiers and reception of 
respective keyring contents in the neighborhood, nodes try to 
find common XORed keys with their neighbor nodes in the 
first step. If no common XORed key with a neighbor is found, 
the nodes try to find a common single key.  
The reason behind searching for XORed keys initially is 
that resiliency that an XORed key provides is more than a 
single key does. An attacker has to obtain two operands of an 
XORed key in order to capture a link secured by that XORed 
key, while it is enough to capture just one single key in single 
link key case. In our scheme, using XORed key as a link key 
is promoted; if there is a chance to use XORed key or single 
key to secure a link, XORed key usage is preferred. However, 
we should admit that it is less probable to find out a shared 
XORed key in keyrings of neighboring nodes, because the size 
of XORed key pool is much larger than the size of single key 
pool.  
If both of these attempts fail, nodes try to derive new 
XORed keys using single keys pre-loaded in their memory. A 
node XORs two single keys in its single keyring to match an 
XORed key in the XORed keyring of its neighbor. For 
example, suppose a and b are two neighbors with no secure 
link yet established. If node a has single keys t and u in its 
keyring such that utx ⊕= , and x is in b’s XORed keyring, 
then node a XORs t and u to obtain x and the nodes a and b 
can use x to establish a secure link. If neighboring nodes still 
cannot find a common key, they start key transfer phase which 
is described in the next subsection. 
The algorithm of shared-key discovery phase is depicted in 
Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Pseudo-code of shared-key discovery phase. 
D. Key Transfer Phase 
Main contribution of our scheme is in the key transfer 
phase. When shared-key discovery phase ends, there would 
possibly be some neighboring nodes that failed on finding 
common key and some succeeded on setting up secure 
communication links. Successfully established secure links are 
used to help creating secure links between insecure neighbor 
nodes in the key transfer phase. 
If two neighboring nodes a and b cannot establish a secure 
link in shared-key discovery phase, they apply three methods 
that will help them to agree on a key.  2603
 In the first method, a node searches its own single keyring 
and the single keyrings of its neighbors with which it has a 
secure communication link (from now on mentioned as direct 
secure neighbor). If there are two single keys, one in its single 
keyring and one in its secure neighbor’s single keyring, such 
that XOR of these single keys matches an XORed key in its 
unsecure neighbor’s XORed keyring, it transfers the single 
key from its direct secure neighbor and establishes secure 
communication with its unsecure neighbor using XOR of 
those single keys.  
For example, suppose b has the XORed key tsx ⊕=  in its 
XORed keyring, and one of its operands t is found in node a, 
the other operand s is found in direct secure neighbor node c 
of a. In this method, a transfers the single key s from node c 
and XORs it with its single key t. In this way, it obtains a new 
XORed key x which a shares with b. For this operation, node 
a needs to know the identifiers of the single keys in direct 
secure neighbors’ single keyrings. These key identifiers are 
already supplied in shared-key discovery phase, so there is no 
need to resend them in this phase. Since there is no extra 
messages sent through nodes, this method (and also the 
upcoming methods) has minimal effect on communication 
cost. Algorithm for this method is given in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3.  Method 1:  nodes try to transfer single keys from their direct secure 
neighbors and XOR them with existing single keys in their keyring to produce 
an XORed key that is found in the keyrings of their neighbors. 
If the first method does not work, the nodes use the second 
method. In method 2, a node transfers an XORed key from its 
direct secure neighbor, and XOR the transferred key with 
another XORed key in its keyring to derive a new XORed key 
that can be used for securing a communication link. In order to 
derive a new XORed key, transferred XORed key and existing 
XORed key in the keyring should have one common operand; 
when two XORed keys are XORed, this common operand 
cancels out and new XORed key becomes XOR of two single 
keys. For instance, suppose nodes a and b are two neighboring 
nodes with no shared key and node c is a’s direct secure 
neighbor. Node c has an XORed key x and a has an XORed 
key y in their XORed keyrings such that x and y have a 
common single key operand. Furthermore, XOR of x and y 
produces another XORed key which is found in the XORed 
keyring of node b. In this setting, a transfers x from c and 
creates XOR of x and y. Afterwards nodes a and b establish 
secure link using this XORed key. Algorithm for method 2 is 
given in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Method 2: nodes try to transfer XORed keys from their direct secure 
neighbors and XOR them with existing XORed keys in their keyring also to 
produce an XORed key that is found in the keyrings of their neighbors. 
If the previous methods do not help to establish a secure 
link, as the last chance, the nodes try method 3. In this 
method, a node searches for two single keys from distinct 
direct secure neighbors, transfers and XORs them to obtain a 
new XORed key. If this new XORed key is also found in the 
XORed keyring of the neighbor node with which the node 
wants to establish a secure link, then this secure link is 
created. Transferred XORed keys should have one common 
operand for the reasons mentioned above. For example, 
suppose nodes a and b are two neighboring nodes that do not 
have a shared key. Moreover, nodes c and d are direct secure 
neighbors of node a. Node c has a single key s and node d has 
a single key t such that their XOR yields a new XORed key 
which also exists in the node b’s XORed keyring. In this 
setting, node a requests to transfer single keys s and t from its 
direct secure neighbors c and d. Upon receipt, node a XORs 
these two single keys and produces a new XORed key, which 
also exists in the XORed keyring of node b. Then, they 
establish a secure link. Algorithm of this method is given 
Figure 5. 
If a node runs these methods in the transfer phase and 
establishes new secure communication links with neighbor 
nodes, it adds these nodes into its direct neighbors list and re-
runs these methods for the purpose of deriving new common 
keys with the neighbors that do not share one. This provides 
further optimization to the transfer phase, and incrementally 
improves local connectivity. 
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Figure 5. Method 3: nodes try to transfer two single keys from two distinct 
direct secure neighbors and XOR them in order to produce an XORed key that 
is found in the keyrings of their neighbors. 
III. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
For the performance evaluation of the proposed scheme, we 
conduct simulations. The simulations are done in MATLAB 
environment in a 2.4 GHz Intel Core 2 Quad desktop PC 
running 32-bit Windows Vista and 64-bit Linux operating 
systems. In simulations, 10,000 nodes are randomly placed 
using uniform distribution in a square field of size 
1000 m ×  1000 m. The radius of the communication range of 
a node is 40 m. Single key pool size is 10,000 keys. Thus, 
XORed key pool size automatically becomes 49,995,000 keys, 
although this key pool is a virtual one and not actually 
generated as discussed in Section II.D. 
Local connectivity is the probability that any two sensor 
nodes share at least one key. In Figure 6, the straight line 
indicates the local connectivity of basic scheme [2] with 100 
single keys. This line serves as a performance threshold to our 
scheme. For our scheme, single keyring sizes increase by 10 
keys, while XORed keyring sizes decrease by 10 keys such 
that the sum of the sizes of two keyrings is 100 keys. When 
single keyring size is small, local connectivity of our scheme 
is lower than the basic scheme. The reason is that probability 
of sharing at least one XORed key is too small since the 
XORed key pool is huge. As the single keyring size increases 
and XORed keyring size reduces, the local connectivity of our 
scheme increases and eventually exceeds the basic scheme 
threshold. The highest connectivity of our scheme occurs 
when 70 single keys and 30 XORed keys are used. At this 
point, local connectivity value of our scheme is 0.97; whereas 
the local connectivity of the basic scheme with 100 keys is 
0.63. This result shows that our scheme provides almost full 
connectivity when the keyring size ratio is selected 
appropriately. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Local connectivity of our scheme compared to basic scheme 
Figure 7 shows the resilience of our scheme compared to 
basic scheme. For our scheme we consider the optimal case, in 
which 70 single keys and 30 XORed keys are used in the key 
rings. Resilience is the fraction of communication links 
compromised over all links in case of a node capture attack. 
Thus, lower values indicate more resilient network. In a node 
capture attack, the attacker captures nodes at random locations 
of the network. When a node is captured, the attacker learns 
the keyring content of the node and these keys are used to 
compromise secure links of other innocent nodes in the 
network. We analyze the change of resiliency with respect to 
different amount of captured nodes. As can be seen from 
Figure 7, our scheme is slightly more resilient at the beginning 
of the attack. However, as the attack continues, basic scheme 
becomes slightly more resilient starting from the point where 
60% of the links are compromised. Nevertheless when our 
scheme is compared to the basic scheme, the difference in 
ratio of links compromised is always lower than 5%. This 
means our scheme provides better connectivity with a 
marginal cost of resilience.  
 
 
Figure 7. Resilience of our scheme compared to basic scheme. 
In order to understand the extra communications that our 
transfer phase incurs, we analyze a metric called transfer cost.  
This transfer cost metric is defined as the average number of 
keys exchanged between sensor nodes in order to establish a 2605
 link key in the transfer phase. Transferred keys are usually the 
missing operands of XORed link keys. In method 1 and 
method 2, one key (single key for method 1 and XORed key 
for method 2) is transferred from direct secure neighbors in 
order to produce a new XORed link key. Meanwhile in 
method 3, two single keys are transferred from two distinct 
direct secure neighbors. According to our simulation results, 
the total number of keys transferred between secure direct 
neighbors is 269,210 for the optimal case where 70 single keys 
and 30 XORed keys are used in the keyrings. In return, 
140,550 link keys are established. These results imply a 
transfer cost of 1.92, which means on the average 1.92 keys 
are transferred for each new established links during transfer 
phase.  
Here one should notice that the keys are transferred 
whenever needed to establish a new secure link. In other 
words, they are transferred deterministically, not 
probabilistically. One advantage of this approach is that the 
nodes are not alerted to help other nodes unnecessarily. The 
helper nodes are pinpointed by the help requesting node using 
the information that it already has. Only the helper node is 
requested to send a particular key. The request messages are 
not flooded in the network and extra traffic is avoided. 
IV. RELATED WORK 
Key predistribution is a hot topic that constitutes the basis 
of security in wireless sensor networks. Many security 
mechanisms such as encryption and authentication can be 
provided by accessing to shared keys. Several techniques are 
previously proposed to address this issue. Extensive surveys 
about key distribution in sensor networks are given by 
Camtepe and Yener [4], Zhang and Varadharajan [5], Zhou et 
al. [6], and Xiao et al. [7]. 
Eschenauer and Gligor’s basic scheme [2] is taken as a 
framework for many techniques using probabilistic key 
sharing for key management, such as [3, 8, 9, 10]. These 
studies compared themselves with the basic scheme as we did 
in this paper.  
Chan et al. [3] proposed a probabilistic key sharing scheme 
similar to basic scheme. The main difference is that two nodes 
need at least q shared keys to establish a secure 
communication. It is known that using q > 1 keys instead of 1 
increases resilience of the network since attacker needs to 
capture more than 1 key to compromise a link. q-composite 
scheme has also some similarities with our scheme, because in 
both schemes, nodes require more than 1 key to secure their 
communication. The difference between our scheme and [3] is 
that we store composite keys in the keyrings and we employ a 
transfer phase to improve the local connectivity of the 
network. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
We proposed a key predistribution scheme that achieves 
high connectivity values as compared to basic scheme with 
same keyring sizes. In our scheme, a mixture of regular (a.k.a. 
single) and XORed keys are used in keyrings. Our scheme 
uses XORed keys for link keys, wherever possible. This plays 
an important role to keep the resilience of the network under 
control, since an attacker needs to compromise two single 
keys instead of one. Our scheme uses a novel phase called 
transfer phase, in which the nodes transfer single or XORed 
keys directly from their secure neighbors. Our scheme 
achieves high local connectivity with carefully selected values 
for single and XORed keyring sizes. In our proposed scheme 
with 70 single keyring size and 30 XORed keyring size, there 
is an increase in local connectivity more than 50% as 
compared to basic scheme [2]. More importantly, this 
improvement in local connectivity is not paid with decreased 
resiliency. The difference between resilience of our proposed 
scheme and basic scheme does not exceed 5%. Moreover, 
communication cost is minimized since keyring indices of 
neighbor nodes are already sent out in shared-key discovery 
phase. Nodes transfer only required keys from their neighbors 
in a deterministic way. 
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